Russian Information Warfare Trend Analysis
IW at the Three Levels of Warfare

**Strategic (national resources)**
- Strategic information warfare waged independently could cause an adversary to lose faith in his own data management systems, greatly increasing confusion and difficulty of controlling assets

**Operational (campaigns)**
- On an operational level, interference with enemy data management systems could create damaging time delays in the enemy's ability to make and implement decisions

**Tactical (battles)**
- On the tactical level, IW would be able to compliment the use of other systems to reduce danger to friendly forces and increase chances for success
Lexicon Excerpt

- Disinformation
- Misinformation
- Fake News
- Propaganda
Russian Information Warfare - Tools

- Propaganda, Disinformation, Fake News
- State Media – RT, Sputnik, RIA Novosti
- Russian Troll Farm
- Russian Proxy Sites
- Useful Idiots, Faux Experts
- GRU units 26165 and 74455
- Information Spetsnaz

Russian Information Warfare is usually unethical, immoral, and only sometimes illegal.
Russian IW vs The West

Propaganda, Disinformation, Fake News
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Information Spetsnaz

Not a One on One Conflict. This is asymmetric warfare on a grand scale using common tools in unexpected ways
Propaganda

Propaganda is a core component of PSYOP

- Propaganda is the hammer to PSYOP’s carpentry

Propaganda information

- is not objective
- is used primarily to influence an audience and further an agenda
- often presents facts selectively
- encourages a particular synthesis or perception
- uses loaded language to produce an emotional rather than a rational response
Propaganda

- Propaganda can be generated and disseminated by
  - Governments
  - Political parties
  - Activist groups
  - Commercial firms
  - The news media

- Propaganda
  - Comes from the Latin verb “propagare”, to “propagate”, or spread
  - Heavily used by mass political movements in the early 20th century
  - Was a neutral term until the mid-20th century, when it became pejorative
  - Draws on social psychology and the art of persuasion
Propaganda

**Principles of Propaganda**

- Appeal to emotion, rather than logic
- Cast the appeal as “we” versus “them”
- Target groups on an individual level
- Emphasis on the appeal, not message sponsor

**Propaganda media**

- Paintings
- Posters
- Cartoons
- Pamphlets
- Films
- Radio shows
- TV shows and commercials

Dr. Seuss drew propaganda cartoons to support the war effort in World War II
White, Gray, and Black Propaganda

**White propaganda**
- Correctly attributes information to the sponsor
- Example: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe
- Information provided is truthful, BUT may not necessarily tell the entire story

**Gray propaganda**
- Not attributed to the actual sponsor (which is deliberately concealed)
- Information is attributed to an ostensible source deemed more credible to the target
- Examples:
  - Articles in a newspaper written by an unnamed source
  - Ideas disseminated by other governments, news media outlets, private groups, institutions, or individuals

**Black propaganda**
- Information is falsely attributed, usually to a hostile source
- Subversive and provocative; meant to cause embarrassment or trigger a reaction
- Examples: Forged documents, false stories planted in social media

**Propaganda of the deed**
- Actions undertaken in large measure to achieve a psychological effect on target audience(s)
  - 1942 Doolittle raid on Tokyo
  - 2011 Raid to kill Osama bin Laden
  - Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief after a catastrophe
  - Economic aid
  - Cultural exchanges
Russian IW in Ukraine

1. “Po zakonu” – The appearance of legality
2. Military capability demonstration
3. “Little green men”
4. Use of Proxies
5. Targeted, systematic disinformation
6. Electronic warfare
7. Propaganda by deed
Russian IW theorist Igor Panarin’s theory of information warfare refers to attempts to influence public opinion “in order to gain certain political benefits.”

That influence can “be achieved by information manipulation, disinformation, fabrication of information, lobbying, blackmail,” all with the aim of changing the “decision-making processes of the adversary.”

As Panarin put it, the aims of that military strategy include “a significant alteration of the direction of its internal or foreign policy” and “a replacement of the state’s leadership” with a regime loyal to Russia.
GRU units 26165 and 74455*

- Hacked email accounts
- Hacked into computer networks
- Implanted malware and stole documents
- Used fake personas to release thousands of stolen files
- Set up clandestine infrastructure to conduct their cyber operations
- Misattributed the source of stolen documents provided to Wikileaks and released through other channels
- Used online clandestine tradecraft to obfuscate links to Russia
- Sent spearphishing emails to members of the Clinton campaign
- Used a keylogger to capture keystrokes of DCCC employees
- Clandestinely exfiltrated stolen files from penetrated networks
- Published anti-Clinton content on social media

*Per the 31 JUL 2018 Netyksho et al indictment
“The Russian operation that targeted our democratic institutions, and which continues to this day, is fundamentally different from Cold War schemes. Its main thrust isn’t data collection, but rather an influence campaign—called Active Measures in intelligence parlance—designed to change people’s behavior, and ultimately to sow discord and push divisions inside the United States. This can take the form of spreading fake news over Facebook to sway voters, as we saw during the 2016 election. It also involves manipulating U.S. political officials, influencers and decision-makers to push a more Russia-friendly political agenda. That’s what Butina was attempting.”
Russian IW – 2014 - 2016

• “Firehose of Falsehoods”, Dr. Christopher Paul.
• Cacaphony of bellicose, vicious, divisive clutter
• Truth was fleeting
• Facebook, Twitter, social media overwhelmed
• Existing societal divides exploited
• Few trusted sources in Crimea, Donbas, Russia
• Press not trusted
Russian IW – 2016 - 2018

• Whack-a-mole social media
  • Ads scrubbed
• Facebook, Twitter scrub fake identities
  • Fake accounts continue, sanitized
  • Efforts at hiding improved
• Verification / corroboration possible
  • Blind forwarding continues

November 2018
• Strategic pause
  • Fewer fake articles, less troll presence, less volume, softer language
Government Counter Foreign Disinformation

• GEC focused on ISIS
• RFE/RL out of hide Russian effort – Current Time
~ US Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy

Government
• No education on disinformation or cyber
• Rogue sites continue on .com and .us
US Private Counter Disinformation Efforts

- German Marshall Fund
- Hamilton 68

Universities
- Columbia
- Indiana University - Bloomington
Future Efforts To Counter Disinformation 1/2

• Artificial Intelligence
  • Identify and Counter
  • Provide correct information to key nodes

• Education
  • Disinformation, propaganda, fake news
  • Cyber security, safety
  • Fact check

• Lawfare
  • Update FARA to include propaganda sites
  • Seize unregistered propaganda domains
Future Efforts To Counter Disinformation 2/2

• Issue fact sheets whenever possible – first

• Do NOT fight with trolls – they wallow in muck and like it